Research

My research broadly examines (1) how transnational commercial actors utilize national courts to hold sovereign states accountable for breaking commercial agreements, as well as the domestic consequences of these judicial rulings, and (2) the domestic politics underlying states’ strategic choices of borrowing and default.

Book Project

What actions can creditors take against a sovereign country that fails to repay its debts? Can legislation passed in one country to regulate international transactions have economic consequences in other countries? This book project attempts to answer these questions by examining the development and usage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the role of US courts in sovereign debt markets.

Previous research has focused on the role of reputation in influencing the decision of a country to repay their debt and the perception of investors. I argue, however, that US courts are a critical tool in managing sovereign debt markets and in influencing investors’ decisions to invest. To examine this, I collected and utilized three original datasets covering sovereign litigation from 1811 to the present.

The book traces the shift in US foreign policy from absolute to restrictive sovereignty, examining why US courts gained authority from the State Department to adjudicate disputes involving sovereign states. In the pre-FSIA period, I find that the absence of State Department involvement increased the likelihood of judges granting sovereign immunity, particularly in cases involving democracies. Turning to the FSIA period, I find that Republican-nominated and Democrat-nominated judges in the Southern District of New York apply the statute differently, with Republican-nominated judges more likely to rule against democratic defendant states. Finally, I examine the economic consequences of court judgments against debtor nations. I argue that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff increases investor confidence in a country that has defaulted, generating positive unintended consequences for the debtor state. Specifically, I find that creditor wins reduce borrowing costs, increase intermediate goods imports, and stimulate economic growth—demonstrating that US judicial decisions can have significant spillover effects on the broader economy of the debtor nation.

Publications

Democracy, Debt, and the Bench: Political Ideology in Sovereign Immunity Cases - Accepted at International Organization

Under Review

Information Clearinghouse: Market Implications of US Judicial Decisions

When Firms Lead States: Financial Intermediaries and the Politics of Sovereign Green Bond Adoption

Working Papers

Default Dynamics: The Influence of Regime Type on Default Choice

Borrowed Credibility: Fiscal Stress, Democracy, and Signaling in Sovereign Green Bond Markets

In Progress

Politics of the Green Label: Partisan Polarization and Municipal Climate Finance

Negotiating Sovereign Debt: The Choice for Incomplete Contracts

Civil Unrest and Financial Crises: Distributive Politics in Lebanon

Policy Briefs

“Skewed Recovery: Minority Assistance Programs to Iraq in Historical Perspective”, Luskin Center for History and Policy, with Philip Hoffman and Lily Hindy