Research

My research broadly examines (1) how transnational commercial actors utilize national courts to hold sovereign states accountable for breaking commercial agreements, as well as the domestic consequences of these judicial rulings, and (2) the domestic politics underlying states’ strategic choices of borrowing and default.

Book Project

My dissertation turned book project focuses on the dynamics of sovereign debt politics and the development and usage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). What actions can creditors take against a sovereign country that fails to repay its debts? Can legislation passed in one country to regulate international transactions have economic consequences in other countries? The chapters in this dissertation attempt to answer these questions. Previous research has focused on the role of reputation in influencing the decision of a country to repay their debt and the perception of investors. I argue, however, that US courts are a critical tool in managing sovereign debt markets and in influencing investors’ decision to invest.

To understand why US courts have the power to adjudicate disputes between investors and foreign states, I examine the era before the advent of the FSIA. In the pre-FSIA period, two branches of government—the Executive (the State Department) and Judicial—were responsible for deciding whether a state could be sued in courts or if the traditional norms of sovereignty would be respected. In situations where there is no State Department involvement, my findings indicate a higher likelihood of US judges granting sovereign immunity in cases related to sovereign debt and to democracies. The second chapter delves into the utilization of the FSIA. This statute was designed not only to de-politicize the process of sovereign litigation, but also to establish a definition of what constitutes “commercial,” which, under this act, would include sovereign debt. Examining how judges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York apply the FSIA to sovereign debt cases, I find that Democrat-nominated and Republican-nominated judges rule differently. Republican-nominated judges are more likely to rule against defendants who are democracies than their Democrat-nominated counterparts. The last chapter of the dissertation delves into the economic consequences of court judgments against the debtor nation and their impact on its economy. I argue that US judicial decisions can affect the market because a ruling against the defendant debtor increases investor confidence to reinvest in a country, creating positive unintended consequences for the debtor state. Specifically, it finds that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff alleviates investors’ fears regarding a country that has defaulted. This reduction in investor fears leads to lower borrowing costs, increased trade imports, and economic growth.

Overall, this project explores the change in US foreign policy from one of recognizing absolute sovereignty to that of restrictive sovereignty, why US courts gained the power from the State Department to adjudicate over disputes involving sovereign states, the factors that influence judicial decision-making, and its unintended consequences on the economy. To examine the development and role of US courts in disputes involving sovereign states, I collected and utilized three new data sets covering a time frame from 1811 until March 2022 that provide detailed information on sovereign litigation cases.

Under Review

Violating Impartiality: The United States Judiciary Governing the Market

Working Papers

Information Clearinghouse: Market Implications of US Judicial Decisions

Default Dynamics: The Influence of Regime Type on Default Choice

In Progress

Ballots, Bonds, and Green Backs: How Elections and Regime Types Shape Eco-Financing

Negotiating Sovereign Debt: The Choice for Incomplete Contracts

Civil Unrest and Financial Crises: Distributive Politics in Lebanon

Policy Briefs

“Skewed Recovery: Minority Assistance Programs to Iraq in Historical Perspective”, Luskin Center for History and Policy, with Philip Hoffman and Lily Hindy